Glissading With Crampons

At approximately 1430, a pair of climbers made the all too common mistake of glissading without first removing their crampons.  The resulting trauma to the lower leg of the less experienced member of the party resulted in a minor sprain. The patient was transported via Pisten Bully to Pinkham Notch.

Wounded Skier Sherburne Ski Trail

At approximately 1600, Snow Rangers received word via radio that a skier with a laceration was being treated on the Sherburne Ski Trail. Snow Rangers and MWVSP members responded to find that the patient had been treated and the wound properly dressed by a recreating ski patroller and was being transported down the trail in a sled or on a snowboard. Interviews revealed that the subject had received a full depth laceration around 8” long just above the knee after falling in the wet, slushy snow.  The person skiing behind her was following too closely and no doubt learned a harsh but important lesson about the need for safe following distances and controlled skiing in a backcountry environment.

Lower Leg Injury, Lion Head Route

At approximately 1500, two hikers flagged down passing Snow Rangers who were heading down for the day.  The party had loaned their plastic sled to help a group transport a person with lower leg injury from the Lion Head Winter Route. We encountered a large family group about 100 yards up the trail from the Fire Road sliding a person down and making good time. The injured subject was well splinted with trekking poles and duct tape with continuous circulation, sensation and movement in the foot so we transferred her to the snowmobile and transported here to Pinkham Notch. Upon further assessment, it was evident that the injury was a fracture.

Though this group did a good job caring for the injury and would have made it down in good time, they were very poorly equipped for the Winter Route. The subject was wearing low, zippered “snow sneakers”, and while warm enough for the day’s weather conditions, this type of boot does not have a stiff enough sole for edging in firm snow nor the ankle support of a mountaineering boot. The victim lost their footing somewhere below the rock step, began sliding and sustained the injury when she arrested her fall with her foot against a tree trunk.  There seemed to be a wide range of experience level among the group with only a few ice axes and pairs of crampons among them.  It is important to remember the limitations of your group in terms of ability and experience when doing winter hikes in our unforgiving mountain range.

Fall, Leg Injury – Lion Head Winter Route

We received a call for help for an individual who had sustained injuries while descending the Lion Head Winter Route. The patient had fallen in the steep section of trail, sustaining non-life threatening injuries in the fall. He was extricated from the mountain by Forest Service Snow Rangers, AMC and HMC caretakers, MWVSP patrollers, and bystanders.

This is a very steep section of hiking. Appropriate equipment for the route includes an ice axe, crampons, and good quality winter mountaineering boots. In some conditions, more technical gear might be desirable. This individual was wearing boots more appropriate for summer hiking, along with lightweight traction devices. We cannot confirm that this was the cause of the fall or even played a supporting role. But it is something we observe regularly on this route.

Lost Hiker Boott Spur Ridge

A party lost the trail while descending the Boott Spur ridge. They called the AMC visitor center for assistance, who directed them to call 911. The party spoke with the 911 dispatchers and expressed having lost the trail, having run out of food and water, and requested assistance. SAR groups responded to begin looking for them. During the mobilization of forces, the group was able to find the trail. They then descended to Pinkham and departed without checking out with the visitor center staff.

When the group got into cell phone service in Jackson, they received their phone messages that informed them that rescuers were on the mountain looking for them. They stated that they would have checked out if they had known that rescuers were searching. It’s hard to not be cynical about this statement. If you call 911 for any reason, rescuers will be actively working to assist you until they can verify there is no problem. If you call 911 for a backcountry accident, we still encourage you to try to help yourselves as much as possible. If you manage to fully self-rescue, please give the rescuers the courtesy of letting them know you no longer need assistance.

Leg Injury – Post Hole

After arriving to Hermit Lake for the night, a group was practicing self arrest skills in the headwall of Tuckerman Ravine in the afternoon. While facing into the slope, the victim’s foot plunged into a posthole left behind from a previous ascent. He suffered a leg injury in the fall. USFS Snow Rangers were still in the parking lot at Pinkham when the call for help came. Snow Rangers responded with an MWVSP patroller, an MRS member, the AMC caretakers, the HMC caretakers, and bystanders. The victim was stabilized and transported to the USFS Pisten Bully waiting at the base of the Little Headwall.

This was not the typical sliding-with-crampons injury we frequently see. The actual mechanism of injury was unusual, but there is nothing about their story that puts doubt in our minds about what happened. One notable comment, however, is that avalanche danger that day was rated Moderate for the many slopes that converge on the area in which the group was located. No one in the group was carrying avalanche rescue equipment (i.e. transceivers, shovels, or probes.) Due to the snow loading taking place in the Headwall, rescue teams were limited in how many people ascending into avalanche terrain to assist, which ultimately extended the time necessary to bring the patient down off the mountain. Generally speaking, if you are leading a group into avalanche terrain, you should ensure that all members of the group are carrying appropriate rescue equipment and that you follow safe travel procedures to minimize your exposure to risk.

Stranded hiker on Tuckerman Ravine Trail in the Lip area

A party of three hikers attempted to make their way down the Tuckerman Ravine trail after summiting Mount Washington from Grey Knob camp during a northern Presidential Range traverse. Late in the afternoon on Thursday, May 15th, the trio descended the Tucks trail on snowshoes down a steepening snow slope, inadvertently traveling in the fall line above the main upper waterfall when one of the party slipped and “tumbled” approximately 50-60 feet on the snow. The party decided that descending further was not a good course of action considering trail conditions and the onset of darkness. They decided to dig into the snow above the Headwall and just above the brushy ledge left of the narrows of the Lip. The weather observatory recorded temperatures falling from 50F down to 36F by daybreak with intermittent rain showers for several periods during the night. Hourly weather observations also indicate that fog shrouded the summit.

The group spent Friday night sheltering under tent components atop foam pads and sleeping bags on a small snow ledge which they excavated with snowshoes. The next morning, the group packed up and began an attempt to traverse across the 40 – 45 degree snow slope at around 9:00am. The two boys went first, one at a time, and narrowly made the crossing but with another slip and recovery. The girl chose not to attempt to cross. One of the boys then accessed Lunch Rocks rescue cache and carried a rope ladder back up to the crossing. An attempt to throw a rope ladder across to the stranded hiker ended with the rope ladder irretrievably stuck in a moat. The other boy made his way to the Hermit Lake and alerted AMC and a USFS Snow Ranger at 10:45am, who then made their way to the Lip area, arriving at approximately 11:45am. Rescuers employed a rope and belay to access the stranded hiker and then received a belay from another Snow Ranger from above to exit the snowfield. Both Snow Rangers and the hiker made their way to the summit arriving at 2:23 pm and were assisted by NH Sate Park and Auto Road staff and drove down the Auto Road, arriving at the base at 4:00pm. AMC caretakers and Mount Washington Ski Patrollers hiked down to Hermit Lake with the other two before they continued down to Pinkham Notch Visitor Center.

Analysis:  The main Headwall waterfall and the deep hole it creates in the snow below has claimed at least two lives in the past and is the scene of occasional near misses, including this one. This party had some hiking experience in the White Mountains but only in summer. Summit fog and 50 degree temperatures during this period hampered visibility and no doubt made navigation challenging but it is uncertain why, after the first fall above the waterfall, that the group chose to spend the night in such an exposed location rather than climbing back up several hundred feet to regain the Alpine Garden trail. The party carried a map though when asked why they didn’t consult it, I was told that it was too windy. No one in the party carried crampons or ice axe and though their gear, clothing and footwear were adequate for chilly nights in the range, their lightweight hiking boots were not adequate for kicking secure steps on the steep snow slopes above the Headwall. With no winter climbing training or experience, the party is very lucky that this incident did not turn out much worse. A sliding fall into the waterfall hole or one of the crevasses that were open on the slope below could have been fatal.

Skier fall in Huntington

A skier became caught in his sluff* while skiing Diagonal Gully in Huntington Ravine, causing him to fall approximately 50′ over the Harvard Bulge. He came to rest about 150′ below the ice. His partner knew something had happened, but could not see the fall and did not know exactly what happened. He then skied down, but did not locate his injured partner until he had reached the bottom of the fan. At the same time a solo ice climber had recognized what had taken place and was working his way to the injured skier. The climber and uninjured skier were able to contact 911 to summon assistance while they began to treat the injured skier, who was suffering from a very painful back injury.

Snow Rangers, Mount Washington Volunteer Ski Patrol members, and two AMC caretakers responded on foot from Hermit Lake. The rescue effort was fairly straightforward. A backboard, litter, and technical rescue gear were brought up to patient’s location. He was stabilized and packaged in the litter. Due to the steepness of the snow slope, the litter was belayed down to the bottom of the fan. From here, additional rescuers from AMC, AVSAR, and MRS joined the effort to slide and carry the skier down to the ambulance at Pinkham Notch Visitor Center.

In total, this rescue effort was comprised of 20 people. All but the one Snow Ranger on scene were helping as volunteers. The groups that help make rescues possible in the White Mountains are a dedicated bunch. We sincerely appreciate all that they do. If you are interested in learning more, the New Hampshire Outdoor Council and Mount Washington Volunteer Ski Patrol are good places to start.

*There is a fine line between a wet loose snow avalanche and the normal sluffing produced by skiers in steep terrain. Whether this incident should be classified as an avalanche incident or more simply caused by heavy sluffing may be debatable, but we are considering this to be an accident caused by a loose wet avalanche. In this gully, there are not many options for a skier to get away from his or her sluff, which is a common course of action. The skier described the sluff that caught and carried him over the ice cliff as being up to 3′ deep, wet, and heavy. He described trying to fight it momentarily before realizing that it was too big to fight. When we arrived on scene, there was a sluff debris pile in the immediate vicinity, but it was not deep enough to have buried a person. The primary hazard associated with the loose snow avalanche in this case is the cliff that sits at the base of the route.

It is also worth mentioning that the pair of skiers are “regulars” on Mt. Washington. They understand the risk involved in the sport and willingly engage with it. The two skiers were equipped with technical climbing gear (rope, harnesses, proper ice tools, etc.) as well as avalanche rescue gear. We understand that accidents can happen to anyone on any given day, no matter how experienced, skilled, or gear-laden one is. This fundamental and unchangeable rule is set by the mountains that we choose to recreate in. This is why we always encourage visitors to bring the right gear to not only help prevent an accident, but to help get through unexpected or unfortunate events.

Hikers stuck on Lion Head

After climbing through Tuckerman Ravine earlier in the day, a pair of hikers descending Lion Head Winter Route each slipped and fell in the steep section of the route (independent of each other). Neither person was injured in the fall. However, having not hiked this trail before, they did not know how much farther down they would need to descend before the trail became less steep. They had appropriate clothing for the winter, but they fell short of being fully prepared. They had no ice axe or crampons, and they were wearing lightweight sneakers with microspikes and a different brand of slip on traction. They were able to make a call to 911 to ask for help with the descent.A Snow Ranger and four volunteer Ski Patrol members responded from Hermit Lake. At the scene, they encountered the hikers near the bottom of the steep section. One hiker was at the top of the rock step and the other was approximately 75′ uphill. The lower of the two was able to descend with some coaching and a hand line. The upper hiker was given an ice axe and downclimbed while on belay through the steep section. They were both transferred to Pinkham by USFS snowmobile.This is a common scenario that plays out every spring. Thankfully, this event ended without injury. The pair did need to endure several hours with cold wet feet due to wearing mesh sneakers- but thankfully again, they had spare socks and shoes in their vehicle. A couple of the points we discussed with them after the fact included:

  • Winter/Spring conditions take longer than summer hiking times. Leaving Pinkham at 1:15 put them at a disadvantage early on.
  • Making the mistake of thinking lightweight traction devices are the same thing as crampons. They also did not carry ice axes, although one did make a comment along the lines of “I’m glad I had my knife. It was the only thing that stopped my fall.” Similar to microspikes vs. crampons, a pocket knife does not offer security in steep terrain as an ice axe does.
  • Not carrying or using a map. When asked from a distance, the pair responded that they did not know if they were on the trail or not (they were). They apparently hiked up through Tuckerman, presumably in the Lip bootpack, then at the summit asked other hikers which was the fastest way down. They chose Lion Head over the Auto Road since it was the shortest distance, but despite following blue plastic blazes, they had thought they may have lost the trail after descending below treeline.

April 12th was the date of the Friends of Tuckerman Ravine race, the Son of the Inferno. This annual event draws a large crowd. We counted about 1850 people entering the Hermit Lake courtyard from the Tuckerman Ravine trail from around 8am to 3pm (thanks, Alec!) Also, this number does not count the hundreds that hiked up Lion Head or went into Huntington Ravine. For this many people to have spent the day on Mt. Washington and only have had four incidents is remarkable. Surely a lot has to do with luck, but we want to take a moment to thank the hundreds or thousands of you who did your homework, came prepared, were self-reliant, and went home with all your bones and soft tissues intact. We also want to thank the Mount Washington Volunteer Ski Patrol for all their help, not only on Inferno day, but each and every weekend from March through May. This is an incredible group of people who give a remarkable amount of time so that we all can better enjoy our days in the Ravine. Be sure to thank them when you get the opportunity!

Group of four hikers stranded above Tuckerman Ravine

A large group of 15 hikers from Bloomsburg University in Pennsylvania set off for Mt. Washington before 5 a.m. Five members of the group turned back before the summit. The other ten continued onward, reaching the summit at approximately 12:30. On the descent, one hiker was moving slowly, so the group split again. Six continued down the Lion Head Trail and made it to Pinkham without incident. In rapidly deteriorating weather, the last four missed the junction of the Tuckerman Ravine Trail and Lion Head Trail into Tuckerman Ravine. They continued down to Tuckerman Junction, above Tuckerman Ravine. At approximately 3:30-4:00p.m., they reached the trail sign at this junction. At least one member of the group had been here on a previous trip and knew that they should not continue down the Tuckerman Trail. They decided to stop descending, but due to weather and the slower hiker’s physical condition they were unable to ascend back in the direction they came from. They did what they could to create a sheltered spot, called 911 and triggered the emergency function of their personal locator beacon.

While rescue teams mobilized, the group waited. Although early in the day conditions above treeline were relatively straightforward, later in the afternoon and evening they took a turn for the worse. Temperatures dropped below zero F, winds reached gusts of 95mph, and several inches of recent snow were being blown across the mountain. In these conditions and without shelter and proper equipment, it is extremely difficult to spend a night above treeline without incurring significant cold-related injuries.

A total of approximately 25 people responded to the callout, including USFS Snow Rangers, Mountain Rescue Service, and New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game. In the face of deteriorating conditions, a decision was made to attempt to locate and evacuate the party that evening. One team ascended the Lion Head Winter Route, while two others ascended the Auto Road in a Mount Washington State Park snow tractor. Teams had a GPS location from the PLB showing the group was in the vicinity of Tuckerman Junction. In favorable weather, this would make it easy enough to locate a group. However, blizzard conditions made the entire rescue effort more challenging. At times it was difficult to simply keep a team together without losing the hiking trail. Visibility was less than needed to move from one cairn to the next. Radio communications between teams were also challenging.

At 10:19pm, rescuers located the group near the junction of the Alpine Garden Trail and Tuckerman Ravine Trail. Fortunately, assessments of their conditions indicated they could possibly hike out under their own power. All three rescue teams regrouped and hiked out with the four hikers via the Alpine Garden Trail and Huntington Ravine Trail to the “Cow Pasture” on the Auto Road. An additional snow tractor from the State Park was brought down from the summit to assist with the evacuation. Injuries to the party were limited to relatively minor cold related injuries.

Snow Ranger Commentary

This incident turned out quite well, all things considered. There are many lessons that can be drawn from this event, some of which are commendable and others we believe could have been done differently:

  • Navigation: This was the second incident this season when hikers missed the turn onto Lion Head. The first resulted in an avalanche (see 12-28-2013 summary). In low visibility conditions, it is imperative that a party stays on the intended route. Maps, compasses, and GPS units are all useful for this, but they can be very difficult to use when conditions are tough.
  • Timing: The group started their hike before 5a.m., with a turn-around time of 12:45. While they did reach the summit before this time, the plan did not leave sufficient time for descent. Mt. Washington often requires as much time to descend as it does to ascend. If it takes 8 hours to reach the summit, plus 8 hours to descend, that makes for a 16 hour day on the mountain. This is a long time to be hiking, even for physically fit and experienced hikers.
  • Experience: In our interviews with the victims, it came to light that the slow hiker who caused the group to move slowly had very little hiking experience. In our experience, Mt. Washington in winter usually is not the best place to learn how to hike. With groups of varying experience levels, it’s best to be conservative in your route planning. To his credit, the hiker rallied for the hike out, working hard and complaining little.
  • Planning ahead: The group had left early enough in the morning that the Observatory weather forecast was not yet published. Regardless, Sunday’s forecast that was published on Saturday should have been taken into account in the trip plans. The forecast called for a relatively calm start to the day, with a rapid increase in winds in the afternoon. This is precisely what happened, causing visibility to drop and eventually leading to the missed trail junction.
  • Use of the PLB device: Increasingly, technology is finding its way into the mountains. In this incident, the GPS location provided by the PLB system proved invaluable for helping rescuers locate the group, and likely saved them from more serious injuries or death. These devices, effective as they are, should not be viewed as a replacement for equipment, experience, and judgment. As this case illustrates, rescue is neither a quick process nor an easy one to execute. Had conditions deteriorated much further, rescue that night may not have been possible. If you carry of these devices, please know that the efforts made to track down your party will not be insignificant. Use them when necessary, but think twice before pressing the button. We have no way to know whether your situation is life-threatening or something far more benign that might not require full scale rescue assistance.
  • Deciding to stay put: As much as we like to see groups self-rescue, at times that is not the best option. When this group made it to Tuckerman Junction, the hiker who had been there before knew that continuing to descend would be a dangerous decision. Given the increasing avalanche danger that evening, we think avoiding Tuckerman was a very intelligent decision. Further, staying in one location allowed rescuers to go to a single GPS location, rather than trying to chase down a moving target. It also gave them an opportunity to attempt to find some shelter (which they did not have much luck doing.) They would have had a much better chance of successfully hunkering down if they had brought equipment intended for this possibility. When traveling in a large group, the extra load can be shared so that no one needs to feel overly burdened.

Overall, we are very thankful that this incident ended as well as it had. It could have very easily taken a turn for the worse in a number of different ways.

Avalanche Accident in Tuckerman Ravine

Two hikers descending from the summit triggered an avalanche that carried them down the Lip of Tuckerman Ravine.  In this incident, a group of four hikers started up from Pinkham Notch Visitor Center. Along the ascent, the group separated into two teams of two. Descending in poor visibility and fading daylight, the faster team lost the trail and inadvertently began descending the Lip. This forecast area had been rated Considerable avalanche danger due to expected wind loading late in the day. The slower team, realizing the other party had gone off trail, followed their tracks to the crown line of the avalanche. From there they were able to verbally communicate with their friends and learn the extent of the injuries. They decided it would be safer to descend the Lion Head Summer Trail to summon assistance.

As an avalanche forecasting center, we were not surprised that the party triggered an avalanche in the location they did. Considerable danger includes “human triggered avalanches are likely” in its definition. Weather conditions in the days prior to the accident created conditions ripe for avalanche activity. About a week before the accident, Mt. Washington was subjected to a warm rain event. This created slick crusty snow surface conditions for future snow and wind-loading land on and create new stability problems. In the 48 hours prior to the event, about 10.5” of new snow had fallen, with 1-3” having been forecasted for the 28th. During this time, west and northwest winds also increased in speed from 30-40mph to 60-80mph. This created a situation with increasingly dense slab building on top of weaker layers, all of which sat on the pre-existing crust.  This is a typical scenario for Mt. Washington; one in which we regularly see human triggered or naturally triggered avalanches.

The hikers rode the avalanche to the base of the Open Book, adjacent to Lunch Rocks. Along the way they sustained non-lifethreatening injuries. In the debris, they ended up only partially buried or on top of the snow, one was at the toe of the debris and the other at the top of the debris. They reported taking about a half hour to collect themselves and figure out what happened. They also did not understand where exactly they were, or that the Tuckerman Ravine Trail could be followed downhill from their location. They knew they had fallen a long way below the trail they intended to descend, so they began to climb back up, which is when they began communicating with their friends above.

The uninjured hikers arrived at the AMC Caretaker’s quarters to tell her of the accident. She quickly notified USFS Snow Rangers, who began mobilizing rescue teams. Rescuers included USFS Snow Rangers, members of Mountain Rescue Service and Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue, caretakers from the AMC and HMC cabin, and a handful of helpful bystanders who were staying overnight at the Harvard Cabin. The rescue itself was not particularly noteworthy. A rescue team climbed to the injured hikers, assessed and treated their injuries, and short-roped them down to the floor of Tuckerman. From there the hikers walked down under their own power to Hermit Lake to a waiting snow tractor. They were then transferred to an ambulance at the bottom of the Sherburne Ski Trail.

Analysis:

This is an accident that could have been avoided if just a couple small factors played out differently. Most obviously, if the group had stayed together and stayed on the Lion Head Trail, they would never have entered avalanche terrain.  The two more experienced hikers had been planning to do an overnight at Hermit Lake, while the two with less experience were only doing a day trip. Hence, the two with lightweight daypacks were able to move more quickly than the heavily-laden duo. This was the primary reason for one group going faster than the other, as we understand. The plan had been for the hikers to all regroup at the summit, but the faster group went down ahead. Often in incidents involving missing or overdue hikers, splitting the group is a contributing factor. Many times there is no contingency plan made, or if there is one it is not followed. In this event we don’t know exactly what their meeting plan was. However, if they had either kept the group together for the duration, or stuck with the plan to regroup,  the chances for staying on the trail and avoiding the incident would have been better.

Lost hiker on Lion Head

A hiker descending off the summit of Mt. Washington became lost after dark without a headlamp. He sent numerous texts to his friend who, having turned back earlier, was waiting at Pinkham Notch. The last of these messages indicated he needed rescue assistance immediately. These messages were not received until the friend had traveled back to town where cell service is more reliable. It was this string of messages that instigated the rescue effort. Teams from the USFS and Mountain Rescue Service located the hiker near treeline on the Lion Head Trail. He was uninjured and was able to walk down to Hermit Lake; from here he was transported by snowmobile to Pinkham Notch.

Four incidents in Tuckerman

This was a very busy day in the ravine, in part because it was the first Saturday this season with really nice spring weather. The first incident was a dislocated shoulder resulting from a fall in Left Gully. After an unsuccessful attempted to reduce the dislocation, the patient and his party were able to walk themselves out from the ravine.

Shortly after the first, a skier fell in the Sluice area, resulting in a lower leg injury. Within minutes of this fall, another skier fell in the Lip, suffering a significant head laceration. Both patients were evacuated by Snow Rangers, the MWVSP, the AMC caretaker, and a large number of volunteers.

The fourth incident was sustained on the lower part of the Tuckerman Ravine Trail. A hiker punctured his lower leg on a broken branch when stepping off the trail. He was able to continue hiking.

“Moderate” danger and avalanche accidents
-respect and awe.

Over the last several years we have seen an increasing number of avalanche related close calls involving skiers and climbers.  Between better equipment and getting out more during the midwinter avalanche season, incidents have been increasing.  Of the different accidents that we routinely deal with, I believe avalanche accidents will slowly increase as part of our overall percentage of accidents on Mount Washington and may become the dominate player over time.  As I started to put together a post describing Thursday’s avalanche incident in the Lower Snowfields it occurred to me it would be better to look at the big picture.  (However all the photos are from this most recent incident.) I felt the need to do a Pit post to highlight the avalanche potential that you may encounter when climbing or skiing on Mount Washington under avalanche ratings in the middle of the danger scale, namely Moderate and Considerable.  When snow stability falls into Low, High or Extreme it is generally pretty obvious, giving us either the green or red light for steep terrain travel.  In between these more clear conditions is the middle ground, which of course is the most challenging for you, and us, to analyze.  Stability tests with false stables, a little less or more new snow than forecasted, hidden sweet spots, and  thin slabs leading into thicker slabs are just a few example that we need to pay attention to as we negotiate the terrain.

A brief and clearly understood rating system to predict a natural phenomenon is not easy and can’t convey all the nuances for all situations.  The avalanche danger rating system blends the likelihood of occurrence (from unlikely to certain), with the consequences (relatively low to high), and travel advice to mitigate the potential hazard.  Because one word can’t describe the entire situation it is always important to both read the entire text explaining the details of any advisory and look for signs of unstable snow in the field.  There is no way around the fact that if you play in avalanche terrain you need avalanche education and mentored experience to be there safely.

Of the 9 avalanche fatalities I have dealt with since 1991, 6 climbers died primarily due to trauma while the 3 skiers died due to a combination of asphyxiation and trauma.  New Hampshire, and more broadly northern New England, leads our nation in the percentage of avalanche deaths that result from trauma.  Our terrain and generally low snowfall create scenarios that bring us into rocks, over cliffs, into the trees more often as we hunt for areas to pursue our sports.  Our ability to ski tour in open terrain or stick to low angle slopes in avalanche terrain is near impossible in most cases.   Of the nine aforementioned avalanche deaths on Mount Washington, four occurred under a Moderate or Moderate moving towards Considerable rating and two under a High rating in Tuckerman and Huntington Ravines.  The remaining three fatalities occurred in the Gulf of Slides where avalanche advisories are not issued. In the two incidents leading to these three deaths the avalanche danger in Tuckerman and Huntington was posted at High.

Turning to this winter, let’s take a look at the avalanche incidents to date.  Of our 6 climber/skier related incidents/accidents summing up to 28 people in the Ravines, 23 were involved in avalanche instigated incidents.  The following bullets are a quick recap of the 5 avalanches involving humans:

  1.  Very early this season, 2 climbers were avalanched in a pocket approaching the base of the first pitch of Pinnacle Gully.  They were able to walk out with no injuries.
  2. In January, 12 climbers were avalanched out of Central Gully. The group was roped up in 4 teams of three climbers. This resulted in three injured climbers, but it certainly could have been much worse.   As an example of what we discussed above, the following is a portion of the advisory that day demonstrating how the text conveys so much more than the one word.

    ….Expect all snow that is not the old concrete from the recent warm up to be harboring weak layers and varying degrees of instability.  Also anticipate bonding at the interface between the icy surfaces and the new low density slabs to be poor.  With increasing winds and more snow today I would also be ready for new crystals to become beat up and fragmented packing into denser slabs over pockets of unconsolidated snow that were deposited yesterday. Due to the slick nature of the old bed surfaces you can expect frequent spindrift sluffing again today perhaps build into slabs on mid-slope benches such as in Odell, Pinnacle and Central.   Because of all this you will probably find some slopes on the upper end of the Moderate rating in several locales in the Huntington gullies. …

    The avalanche rated danger was posted at Moderate

  3. On March 1st, 2 skiers entered the top of the Lobster Claw.  The first entered familiar terrain on relatively firm hard slab.  The second skier entered making more impact on the slope, due to technique, triggering the slab.  The first skier was carried a short distance from his stationary position.  The avalanche entrained more snow as it descended running full path.  The avalanche danger was posted as Moderate.
  4. On March 1st, a solo climber that had climbed all week in Huntington was on a multi-gully day.  He mentioned that he wanted to climb Odell and other gullies.  The only tracks going into the Ravine went up Odell, down South and up Pinnacle.  New snow made this observation obvious and all but assures this was his route.  He was found by the second person in the Ravine that day at 3pm.  The following day one of his axes was found with the pick deeply planted in the hard old bed surface 20-30 feet below the fracture line.  The avalanche danger was posted at Moderate.
  5. On April 4th, 6 skiers went up Hillman’s Highway with the intent of skiing the Lower Snowfields.  The exact details of how the avalanche was triggered, and by who, is difficult to ascertain. However, whether it was the group of 5 above, or the skier below, both triggers were about 12 to 13 meters away from the fracture/crown line.  This is fairly consistent with what pencil hard slabs have the capability of doing, having the propensity to propagate long fractures.  Sometimes this initial fracture leads to: 1. a long shooting crack with no failure, 2. immediate failure under foot causing an avalanche, or 3. propagating until it finds enough stress and weakness to cause failure remotely leading to an avalanche.  It appears this last example is what caused the avalanche in this case.   From the apex, or center highest point, a 13meter long /2cm wide crack runs up to where the group had been standing.

It is plausible that as the second skier started to move the initial fracture occurred in the hard slab and propagated to the area of utmost convexity and highest stress causing the avalanche.   The slope faces close to due East at 80 degrees and has a 40 degree slope angle at its apex.

The crown was 150m long and had an average crown depth of 80 cm.  The upper surface 20cm had Pencil+ hardness while the next 60cm’s down to 80cm layer was softer at Pencil-.  The bed surface was a melt freeze crust <1cm thick from the previous weekend before the Monday-Tuesday storm.

The debris was probed down to between 4’-9’ deep.   The avalanche danger was posted at Moderate.

In recent years there has been an increase in the backcountry use in avalanche terrain in winter, particularly in March. That fact, coupled with an increase in avalanche class participation, and visitors equipped with avalanche safety gear more individuals are getting into avalanche prone conditions.  It really is critical to understand that Moderate is not the new Low as I’ve heard it refered to as, and it’s not only at the 20% mark as the 2nd in a scale consisting of 5 ratings.  It is second on a scale that attempts to predict a natural occurrance that will always have an associated degree a uncertainity.  As we have seen worldwide so many times before, a human triggered avalanche under Moderate or High can very often have the same results……. not good.  Certainly I am not saying Moderate and High are the same, but what I am saying is human triggered avalanches happen under a Moderate rating…period.  This reality plays out every day, all winter, across the slopes of North America.  Understanding this well I therefore have a respect for the “Moderate” snowpack, as on a given day it can be a wolf in sheeps clothing.  I comprehend that to live a long life working in avalanche terrain I must never believe I know exactly what’s going on all the time, so I follow protocols to mitigate risk.  We travel one at a time to islands of safety, we don’t travel over or under our partners without their ok, and always think through the consequences of our intended routes.   So…take the Moderate rating seriously, respect it, and realize there can still be plenty of fun to be had in our snow for the skilled and experienced user by knowing what to look for as you plan your route or travel through it.  As a natural force there will always be a degree of uncertainty in regards to avalanches and because the consequences are so high, namely our lives, respect and awe must be our starting point.    See you in the hills.  Chris

Skier Triggered Avalanche Lower Snowfields

On April 4th, 6 skiers went up Hillman’s Highway with the intent of skiing the Lower Snowfields.  The exact details of how the avalanche was triggered, and by who, is difficult to ascertain. However, whether it was the group of 5 above, or the skier below, both triggers were about 12 to 13 meters away from the fracture/crown line.  This is fairly consistent with what pencil hard slabs have the capability of doing, having the propensity to propagate long fractures.  Sometimes this initial fracture leads to: 1. a long shooting crack with no failure, 2. immediate failure under foot causing an avalanche, or 3. propagating until it finds enough stress and weakness to cause failure remotely leading to an avalanche.  It appears this last example is what caused the avalanche in this case.   From the apex, or center highest point, a 13meter long /2cm wide crack runs up to where the group had been standing.

It is plausible that as the second skier started to move the initial fracture occurred in the hard slab and propagated to the area of utmost convexity and highest stress causing the avalanche.   The slope faces close to due East at 80 degrees and has a 40 degree slope angle at its apex.

The crown was 150m long and had an average crown depth of 80 cm.  The upper surface 20cm had Pencil+ hardness while the next 60cm’s down to 80cm layer was softer at Pencil-.  The bed surface was a melt freeze crust <1cm thick from the previous weekend before the Monday-Tuesday storm.

The debris was probed down to between 4’-9’ deep.   The avalanche danger was posted at Moderate.